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DECIDING LEGAL MEANING
In this unit, we extend our exploration of similarities and differences between how
meaning is understood in linguistic approaches to language and in statutory inter -
pretation. We do this by examining the reasoning developed in one among a large
number of cases worldwide that have looked at the meaning of the word sculpture for
the purpose of copyright law. The main question in this case (on which a number of
the legal issues turned) was: is a Star Wars Stormtrooper helmet a sculpture?
The task in this unit consists of two sections: first, a directed exploration of the
meaning of the word sculpture; second, some questions that follow a description of
essential points in the case. (Both accounts are quite long by comparison with material
presented to introduce other activities in this book; but each is brief and selective 
in relation to the detail contained in the case in question.)
First, we approach the issues in the case by thinking about how the meaning 
of sculpture can be investigated outside the specialised sphere of legal interpretation.
1 Make a note of three or four objects or artefacts you consider to be obviously
sculptures. They may have names or you may need to describe them.
2 Now make a second note of the same number of objects or artefacts, but ones you
believe to be clearly not sculptures.
3 Now make a third note, of objects or artefacts you consider to be borderline cases:
objects you think would divide people consulting their intuitions about whether
the word sculpture fits.
4 Now, drawing on Unit A6, assess how the exemplars in your three lists might fit
into a ‘prototype’ account of word meaning.
5 Your three lists begin to map your mental model of the extension of the word
sculpture: the set of things in the world that the word can be used to refer to. How
far do you detect historical and/or cultural variation in decisions whether objects
will satisfy the concept ‘sculpture’? How far is such variation also likely to exist
within a single society?
6 Write a brief definition, looking at your three lists (but not at the paragraph that
follows) that tries to capture what you think a sculpture is.
7 Now compare your definition with some definitions produced by scholars in
relevant fields, including dictionary-writing:
7.1 In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, sculpture is ‘the art of forming representa -
tions of objects etc. or abstract designs in the round or in relief by chiselling
stone, carving wood, modelling clay casting metal, or similar processes’.
7.2 Dictionaries arrive at their statements of meaning in different ways, however;
so it is interesting to compare their entries for the same word. The Collins
COBUILD Dictionary, for example, bases the order in which it presents
different senses on their frequency of use in a corpus of several billion words;
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and the full Oxford English Dictionary (OED) describes each word by showing
the historical development and branching of interwoven senses. The OED
entry for sculpture as a noun gives four main meanings, each divided into
subsidiary senses, matched to periods of use and supported with illustrative
quotations.
8 Develop your sense of sculpture further by considering the sense relations the word
enters into with other words. For example, is sculpture a hyponym (type of) either
fine art or craft? Of hobby or pastime? Of furniture? Beyond sense relations of 
this kind, you may also want to consult a thesaurus, which relates words to their
neighbours and opposites by meaning in the same semantic field. Roget’s Thesaurus,
for example, locates sculpture next to ‘carving, statuary, ceramics, plastic arts’. To
develop a fuller understanding of sculpture as a concept, you might consult
encyclopedias, either online or in print, and/or histories of relevant fields.
Computer-generated KWICs (‘key word in context’ reports) can show a list of
occasions of use of a given word in a given corpus, with a selected number of words
on either side of the target word; these are also helpful in considering a word’s
behaviour in context. (It is possible to download a free concordancer software
programme, such as Laurence Anthony’s AntConc, to enable you to do this.)
9 Using these various methods and resources, try to build up a profile of possible
and likely use of sculpture, including contexts in which the word occurs and the
values and implications associated with it. Such a profile gives a picture of the
word’s ordinary use, subject to the proviso that such data will certainly show up
variation on several dimensions rather than a single meaning.
10 Now we will go on to ask how, faced with such variation and complexity, a court
can go about arriving at a singular, legally correct meaning for sculpture in a given
legal context. To do this, first it is necessary to read a brief account of the case:
Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth
The case of Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth concerned the designs for Imperial Stormtrooper
helmets and armour featured in the first Star Wars film (somewhat enigmatically called
Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope, released in 1977). Ainsworth, the defendant, had
created moulds and other materials to make the helmets and armour used during
filming, based on initial storyboard sketches and a clay model prepared on behalf of
Lucasfilm (the main claimant). The resulting white helmets and armour became known
as the ‘cheesegrater’, ‘jawbone’, ‘X-wing fighter pilot’, ‘rebel troop’, ‘chest box’, and
others. Roughly 30 years later, Ainsworth set up a website selling replicas of the helmets
and armour online to Star Wars fans (who organise themselves as ‘Garrisons’ and enjoy
costumes and other designs related to the continuing film series).
Lucasfilm alleged copyright infringement in California and obtained a default
judgment against Ainsworth. They then sought to enforce that judgment against
Ainsworth, or enforce their American copyright claim, in the UK (where Ainsworth
was based). There were numerous claims, and issues both of fact and law, in the case.
But the questions all buttressed a central claim and counterclaim, each of which
depended on whether any of the helmets were either ‘sculptures’ or ‘works of artistic
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craftsmanship’ within the meaning of s. 4 (‘Artistic works’) of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
This central question occupied the English courts throughout three proceedings at
successive levels: first instance court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court. At first
instance, it was held that the Imperial Stormtrooper helmet was not a sculpture within
the meaning of the Act. Rather, it was a mixture of costume and prop, whose function
was utilitarian: it made a contribution to the film, which overall was the work of art.
The same reasoning was applied to the armour, and analogous argument made on the
different requirements for ‘works of artistic craftsmanship’. Toy models marketed by
Lucasfilm were also deemed not to be sculptures, because their primary purpose was
to be used in play rather than ‘exhibited, viewed or contemplated’. The Court of Appeal
and Supreme Court concurred with that first instance judgment.
Because no copyright subsisted in the helmets or armour as sculptures under UK
copyright law, and so were not protected as ‘artistic works’ by UK copyright law, only
Lucasfilm’s claim based on infringement under US law succeeded. The claimant’s other
claims (totalling USD 20 million) failed; and Ainsworth’s counterclaim that he had
produced artistic works (defending an income derived from sales of the helmets and
armour of roughly USD 14,000) also failed.
Interpreting sculpture
The reasoning process through which the courts arrived at a correct, legal meaning for
sculpture illustrates some key features of statutory interpretation outlined elsewhere in
this thread.
At first instance, Mann, J (i.e. Mr Justice Mann, the judge) acknowledged difficulty
with the concept that a sculpture is an artistic work under the 1988 Act (CDPA 1988).
He noted that:
There is no statutory definition of ‘sculpture’ for the purposes of this area of legislation.
The only statutory assistance one has in relation to this question is a somewhat circular
indication of what is included: ‘“sculpture” includes a cast or model made for purposes
of sculpture’ (s. 4(1)(2)(b)).
The judge looked to relevant authorities for guidance. He found that what such
authorities provide is principally a series of examples, linked to factors taken into
account by judges in deciding a particular case. Early authorities included an 1891 case
applying an earlier Copyright Act in which artistic merit played a part that was no longer
a feature of the 1988 legislation. In a 1995 case brought by the appliance manufacturer
Breville, the claimants successfully claimed copyright in plaster shapes used as moulds
for differently shaped sandwiches produced by their sandwich maker (though there
was then found to have been no infringement). Another relevant case was a case in
which it was claimed that a Frisbee (the plastic flying disc) was a sculpture, though the
court found they were purely functional, indeed industrial objects.
In these and other cases, dictionary definitions, including one from the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary and one from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
were introduced. They were not used as authorities, but as aids to memory and more
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precise formulation. Judicial reference was also made to an article on ‘Art of sculpture’
in the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, which stated that:
Sculpture is not a fixed term that applies to a permanently circumscribed category of
objects or sets of activities. It is, rather, the name of an art that grows and changes and is
continually extending the range of its activities and evolving new kinds of objects. The
scope of the term is much wider in the second half of the 20th century than it was only
two or three decades ago, and in the present fluid state of the visual arts, nobody can
predict what its future extensions are likely to be.
Despite this description, the courts concluded that what was required was that a
work in question should be a sculpture ‘in the ordinary sense of that term’ or ‘as
included in the extended definition of sculpture contained in the Act’. Interpretation
could proceed, therefore, by reasoning from ‘what is the normal understanding of the
expression sculpture’, despite the view of one judge suggesting that ‘that is a pretty loose
boundary’. In another case, the judge (Laddie, J) pointed to a sense of purpose inherent
in whether the definition should be a broad or narrow one:
The law has been bedevilled by attempts to widen out the field covered by the copyright
Acts. It is not possible to say with precision what is and what is not sculpture, but [. . .]
a sculpture is a three-dimensional work made by an artist’s hand. It appears to me that
there is no reason why the word ‘sculpture’ in the 1988 Act should be extended far beyond
the meaning which that word has to ordinary members of the public.
Extending the process of analysis further in Lucasfilm, Mann, J proposed a ‘multi-
factorial’ approach, formulating a list of eight ‘points of guidance’ to be taken into
account in considering the meaning of the term sculpture for the purposes of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
The first three points of guidance appear merely to provide general orientation:
(i) some regard had to be had to the normal use of the word;
(ii) nevertheless, the concept could be applicable to things going beyond what would
normally be expected to be art in the sense of the sort of things expected to be
found in art galleries; and
(iii) it was inappropriate to stray too far from what would normally be regarded as
sculpture.
Mann, J’s fourth point noted that, by statute, no judgment should be made as to
artistic worth. His fifth point echoes Laddie, J’s concern above, regarding possible
overexpansion of the category of protectable sculptures:
(v) not every three-dimensional representation of a concept could be regarded as a
sculpture, otherwise every three-dimensional construction or fabrication would
be a sculpture.
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Points (vi) and (vii) highlight purpose and function:
(vi) it was of the essence of a sculpture that it should have, as part of its purpose, a
visual appeal in the sense that it might be enjoyed for that purpose alone, whether
or not it might have another purpose as well [. . .]; and
(vii) the fact that the object had some other use did not necessarily disqualify it from
being a sculpture, but it still had to have the intrinsic quality of being intended
to be enjoyed as a visual thing.
The final point concerned materials or mode of production:
(viii) the process of fabrication was relevant but not determinative; there was no reason
why a purely functional item, not intended to be at all decorative, should be
treated as a sculpture ‘simply because it had been (for example) carved out of
wood or stone’.
Immediately following this list, the judge emphasised that the enumerated factors
were guidelines, not rigid requirements. The question ‘What is a sculpture?’, he
concluded, ‘has some of the elements about it of the unanswerable question: “What is
Art?” ’. Analysed by multifactorial reasoning, nevertheless, the helmets were found to
be intended to express something and to have interest as objects, but served the
purpose principally of character portrayal within the film rather than being aesthetic
in themselves. This did not give them the necessary quality of artistic creation required
by the Act.
The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court commended multifactorial analysis for its
adaptation of implicit understanding of normal usage in the direction of require ments
specific to the protection afforded by copyright; and the first instance outcome was
upheld. Reservation was nevertheless expressed about points (vi) and (vii), which draw
a fine distinction between the purpose for which an object may actually be used and its
purposive nature: what Mann, J had described as ‘its intrinsic quality of being intended
to be enjoyed as a visual thing’. The difficulty presented by that fine distinction was
described by Jacob, LJ (i.e. Lord Justice Jacob) in the Court of Appeal as precisely the
reason why the judge in the lower court had outlined ‘a number of considerations which
should act as signposts to the right answer’. Joining in commendation of the multi -
factorial approach, Jacob, LJ nevertheless appeared to undermine it with a comment
pointing in a different direction (which was later queried in the Supreme Court):
The result of this analysis is that it is not possible or wise to attempt to devise a
comprehensive or exclusive definition of ‘sculpture’ sufficient to determine the issue in
any given case. Although this may be close to adopting the elephant test of knowing one
when you see one, it is almost inevitable in this field.
Declaring, attributing and deciding meaning
Having read this condensed (but still quite long) account of the interpretation of
sculpture in Lucasfilm, now address the following issues:
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Activity ✪
❏ How closely does the approach adopted by the judge at first instance (Mann,
J) reflect your understanding of approaches to legal interpretation as
outlined in Units A6 and B6?
❏ Is using ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ meaning helpful as a starting point in deciding
what a word means, if whatever is decided as that meaning will then be
modified to fit the requirements of a piece of legislation being applied?
❏ How successful do you consider the multifactorial test for sculpture approved
by the Supreme Court? Is using some such test essential if problems of ‘the
elephant in the room test’ or the ‘What is Art?’ question are to be avoided?
❏ Finally, one school of legal theory, known as legal realism, has seriously
queried the sorts of reasoning judges engage in. It suggests that such
approaches to interpretation serve merely as a vehicle for decisions that are
ultimately made on other grounds. Do you consider this to be a risk with
the kinds of semantic argument put forward by the courts in interpreting a
statutory word such as sculpture?
SPOKEN AND WRITTEN PERFORMATIVES
In this unit, we look at how performative speech acts take place in three different
mediums: in speech, in writing, and in electronic communication. We consider the
history of performativity in changing linguistic and social relations brought about by
the shift from orality to literacy, and speculate about challenges facing performatives
that have accompanied the rise of electronic means of communication and increased
frequency of legal transactions and interactions at a distance.
Identifying legal speech acts
Consider the following excerpt from the will made by the American actress Marilyn
Monroe (1926–1962):
Last Will and Testament of Marilyn Monroe
I, MARILYN MONROE, do make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will and
Testament.
FIRST: I hereby revoke all former Wills and Codicils by me made.
SECOND: I direct my Executor, hereinafter named, to pay all of my just debts, funeral
expenses and testamentary charges as soon after my death as can conveniently be done.
THIRD: I direct that all succession, estate or inheritance taxes which may be levied
against my estate and/or against any legacies and/or devises hereinafter set forth shall be
paid out of my residuary estate.
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